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of their appeal of the orders and judgment of the Third District Court for Salt Lake
County, Utah entered in favor of Appellee Nathan Coulter.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j), as this
matter has been transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue on this appeal is whether the Trial Court erred in failing to set aside a
default judgment that was deficient in several respects. One set of defects relates to the
failure of the appellee, Nathan Coulter, ("Coulter") and the Trial Court to follow Utah R.
Civ. P. 5 and 5.5 in seeking and entering the default. Specifically, Coulter did not
properly serve the request for default and related papers (the "default papers") on the
appellants Michael and Telisa Toscano ("the "Toscanos") and the Trial Court did not
hold a hearing to determine damages prior to entering the default judgment. Both of
these flaws deprived the Toscanos of notice that default was being sought. The second
set of flaws relate to the fact that the default is based upon a cross claim (the "CrossClaim") that does not state a claim against the Toscanos. Each of the deficiencies
provides an independent reason to set aside the judgment.
Although this case involves a motion to set aside a default, it turns largely on
issues that are not within the Trial Court's discretion. The Trial Court does not have
discretion to deviate from the Rules of Civil Procedure, even when addressing a party in
default. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). Therefore, the Trial
Court's application of and adherence to the Rules of Civil Procedure should be reviewed
for correctness. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 974 P.2d 288, 295 (Utah 1999)
(proper application of law reviewed for correctness). Moreover, a default judgment
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based on a cross claim that fails to state a claim is invalid. Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope
SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). The Trial Court has no discretion in determining
whether to set aside an invalid judgment.
If this Court rules that the default judgment is void but the default certificate is
not*, then the Trial Court erred by not considering whether to set aside the default
certificate under the "good cause" standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). However, because
this case is clear cut, it would be an abuse of discretion to not set aside the default
certificate for good cause.
The decision of whether to set aside a default is largely within the discretion of the
Trial Court. Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, 589 P.2d 767, 769 (Utah 1978). This
discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of the defaulting party in order to provide
him his day in court.2 Id. "It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default
judgment where there is reasonable justification for the defendants' failure to . . .
answer." Board of Educ. v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 807 (Utah 1963). In addition, because
1

This potential result can be reached only in limited circumstances. Specifically, if the
Court finds that there was no error in Coulter's failure to serve the default papers on the
Toscanos' counsel, and that the Cross-Claim does state a claim, but that the Trial Court
did err in entering a default judgment prior to holding a hearing to determine damages
and giving the Toscanos notice of that hearing, the proper result may be to set aside the
judgment and not the certificate. Under this outcome, fairness would require that the
Toscanos be given opportunity to set aside the default certificate under the "good cause"
standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c).
2
The interests of the plaintiffs should also be taken into consideration, and the court
should take care not to work an injustice or inequity to them. Pitts, 589 P.2d at 769.
Pitts involved a case in which the plaintiff had relocated to England and would have been
severely inconvenienced by being required to come to the United States to litigate the
matter. Id. at 768. The record in this case states no reason why it would be unjust to
require Coulter to prove his claims.
2
£C1

•A'\7KKml\i1

this case involves a failure to follow the procedures for notice when seeking a default, the
Trial Court's discretion should be limited. See Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 785
P.2d 682, 684 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)("a court's usual discretionary authority to grant or
deny [a motion to set aside a default] may be greatly narrowed where certain procedural
safeguards were not strictly complied with in obtaining the judgment"). Therefore, even
if this Court were to conclude that the only reversible error was the Trial Court's failure
to consider the good cause standard, this Court should simply remand with directions to
set aside both the default judgment and certificate.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This case turns on application of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5, 55 and 60. The
relevant subsections of those rules are stated below.
1.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) and (b) provide, in relevant part as

follows:
(a)

Service: When required.
(1)

Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the

court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading
subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written
motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand,
offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.
(2)

No service need be made on parties in default except that: . . . (B) a party in

default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served with all pleadings
and papers; (C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any
3
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hearing necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the
defaulting party;

(b)

Service: How made.
(1)

If a party is represented by an attorney service shall be made upon the

attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. If an attorney has filed a
Notice of Limited Appearance under Rule 75 and the papers being served relate to a
matter within the scope of the Notice, service shall be made upon the attorney and the
party.
2.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55 (a) through (e) provide, in relevant part,

as follows:
(a)

Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is

sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is
made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b)

Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1)

By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter

judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the defendant if: (A) the
default of the defendant is for failure to appear; (B) the defendant is not an infant
or incompetent person; (C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to
Rule 4(d)(1); and (D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum that can be made certain by computation.
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(2)

By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by

default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter
judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by
evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct
such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c)

Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an

entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside
in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d)

Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule

apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party
plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a
judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
3.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), provides, in part, for relief from

default judgments as follows:
(b)

Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;

fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of
5
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an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Factual Background Of Claims That Gave Rise To The Lawsuit.

Pedro Boix was the owner of an automobile dealership known as Auto One. From
early 2003 to February, 2004, Michael Toscano was a co-owner of Auto One along with
Mr. Boix.3 In or about February, 2004, Mr. Toscano resigned his position with Auto
One. Around the time of Mr. Toscano's resignation, Mr. Boix asked Sandra Coulter,

3 Telisa Toscano has never been an owner or employee of Auto One. She was a signer
on the Auto Owners bond at issue before the Trial Court. Similarly, though it does not
appear Nathan Coulter was ever an owner of Auto One, he was also a signer on the bond
6
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who was married to Nathan Coulter, to be his co-owner in Auto One. 4 Nathan Coulter
gave or loaned substantial sums of money to Pedro Boix in conjunction with his wife's
involvement in Auto One.
As owner of Auto One, Pedro Boix defrauded a number of people and then fled
the United States on or about September of 2004.5 Western Surety, which had issued a
payment bond on behalf of Auto One, filed a lawsuit interpleading bond funds and
asserting claims for indemnification against Pedro Boix, Sylvia Boix, the Toscanos,
Nathan Coulter and Sandra Coulter. The Toscanos appeared through counsel, D. Bruce
Oliver, and answered the complaint. Coulter subsequently answered and asserted a cross
claim against the Toscanos and Pedro and Sylvia Boix. The Toscanos and their counsel
overlooked the Cross-Claim and did not answer it.
The Cross-Claim contained eleven numbered paragraphs. It mentioned various
causes of action, though it did not set forth the elements of any cause of action in any
coherent or organized fashion, if it states them at all. Though it mentioned fraud, unjust
enrichment and conversion, it clearly did not state the elements of these causes of action.
The only cause of action for which the elements are even arguably stated is breach of
contract. However, this cause of action only alleges that money was loaned to Auto One.

4

Coulter may dispute whether his wife actually became a partner with Boix. However,
his testimony on the record indicates that he and his wife had understood she would
become Mr. Boix's partner in the future.
5
The Toscanos were not involved in Mr. Boix's fraud. The Toscanos do not know
whether Sandra Coulter was involved in Pedro Boix's frauds. Mr. Boix's activities are
mostly immaterial to this appeal.

651 :417557v3

7

It does not allege that money was loaned to the Toscanos. Therefore, it does not state a
claim against the Toscanos.
The Toscanos and Coulter unsuccessfully defended themselves against Western
Surety's claim. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Western Surety on the
indemnification claim. The Toscanos retained the law firm of VanCott, Bagley,
Cornwall and McCarthy to represent them on the appeal of the judgment in favor of
Western Surety. Though a notice of appeal was filed, the Toscanos ultimately settled
with Western Surety and a satisfaction of judgment was entered with respect to those
claims.
B.

History Of The Default

The default involves a long and somewhat complicated procedural history.
Nonetheless, because that history is important to understanding the matters on appeal, it
will be repeated here.
Approximately two and one-half years after filing the cross claim and several
months after the Toscanos and Coulter satisfied the judgments against them, Coulter
sought a default against the Toscanos on the Cross-Claim. Though he had been in
contact with the Toscanos shortly before seeking the default, he did not inquire regarding
their failure to answer. Similarly, though the Toscanos had appeared through counsel,
Coulter's counsel did not attempt to contact the Toscanos' counsel. For unknown
reasons, Coulter's counsel chose to mail the default papers only to a residential address
for the Toscanos. This address was incorrect. Though a default judgment was entered on

8

February 65 2008, the Toscanos did not receive the default papers for approximately four
to eight weeks after this date.
Upon receiving these papers, the Toscanos contacted their attorneys at the
VanCott firm. Due to several miscommunications and uncertainty regarding the nature
of Coulter's claims upon which the default was based, the Toscanos did not file a motion
to set aside the default judgment until May 12, 2008. That motion was based upon Utah
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). However, the Trial Court ruled that that motion should have been
filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), and that it was therefore time barred because it was
filed six days after the expiration of the three month time limit for setting aside
judgments under that provision.
Before an order was entered on the motion to set aside, the Toscanos' counsel
filed a renewed motion to set aside the default judgment. This motion was based upon
the claims presented on this appeal, namely that the Cross-Claim failed to state a claim,
Coulter had failed to properly serve the papers, and Coulter and the Trial Court had failed
to follow the two-step procedure required when a party seeks a default judgment for other
than a sum certain.
The Trial Court did not hold a hearing on this motion and instead issued a minute
entry stating that, because the Cross-Claim did not seek a sum certain, a hearing should
have been held to determine the amount of damages. The Toscanos, correctly reasoning
from established precedent that the Trial Court's ruling implied that there was no valid
judgment in place, filed a motion to set aside the default certificate under the good cause
standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). The Trial Court declined to consider whether to set
9
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aside the default certificate under Rule 55(c), ruling that, by its minute entry, it had not
implied that there was no valid judgment in place.
The Trial Court subsequently held a hearing to determine the amount of
damages.6 At that hearing the Trial Court struggled to find a cause of action in the
Cross-Claim. It also was presented with copious evidence demonstrating that Michael
Toscano was not an owner or principal of Auto One at the time Coulter made the loans in
question and that Telisa Toscano had never been an owner, principal, or employee of
Auto One. Nonetheless, the Trial Court entered judgment against the Toscanos in the
amount of $188,598.62.
C.

Significance Of The Errors Made By Coulter And The Trial Court.

The Toscanos demonstrated their interest in defending themselves in this case.
They answered the complaint and opposed summary judgment. They maintained contact
with their co-defendant, Coulter. Nonetheless, when Coulter made his belated decision to
seek a default against the Toscanos, he did not make significant efforts to insure that the
Toscanos were aware he was seeking a default. Rules 5 and 55 require that default
papers be served on counsel when a party has appeared in the action through counsel 7

6 A motion to reconsider was filed and heard prior to the hearing on damages. In
addressing the motion to reconsider, the Trial Court added more detail to its ruling.
Specifically, in relation to the claim that Coulter had failed to serve the Toscanos, the
Trial Court stated that the Toscanos were not entitled to service because, though they had
appeared through counsel by answering the complaint, they had not appeared for
purposes of the cross claim.
7
Counsel would have been more likely than the Toscanos to understand the significance
of a default being sought against his clients.
10
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The procedure chosen by Coulter not only failed to comport with the Rules, it also failed
to provide timely notice to the Toscanos.
Coulter and the Trial Court compounded this problem by failing to hold a hearing
prior to entry of a default judgment. Had they followed this process, the Toscanos would
have been entitled to notice of hearing on the default judgment under Utah R. Civ. P.
5(a)(2)(C). This notice would have allowed them to seek to have the default certificate
set aside under Rule 55(c) before a judgment was entered.
When the Trial Court was informed of its error in failing to hold a hearing, it
attempted to correct the matter by holding a hearing. However, it treated the judgment as
if it were still valid and immune from challenge under Rules 55(c) and 60(b)(1). In
effect, the Trial Court entered a judgment before holding a hearing. This approach
violates Rule 55.
This procedure was also unfair. Coulter's improper service had already deprived
the Toscanos of notice he was seeking a default before it was entered. By entering a
judgment before holding a hearing, the Court deprived them of another opportunity (to
which they were entitled by the Rules) to contest the default judgment before it was
entered.
The Toscanos had originally missed, by only six days, the three-month deadline
for seeking to have the default judgment set aside under the excusable neglect standard of
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Had Coulter properly served the default papers, or had the
Court held a hearing before entering a default judgment, the Toscanos would have known
of the default before it was entered and could have challenged it under the "good cause"
11
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standard of Rule 55(c). At a bare minimum, they would have been entitled to have their
motion to set aside addressed under the "mistake or excusable neglect" standard of Utah
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
D.

The Judgment Is Void Because the Cross Claim Fails To State A
Claim.

Lastly, procedural issues aside, the inadequacy of the Cross-Claim cannot be
overlooked. It simply does not state a claim against the Toscanos. If the Trial Court was
inclined to liberally construe the Cross-Claim, it should have, at the very least, considered
the evidence to determine whether a default judgment was proper based upon the CrossClaim. A promissory note presented by Coulter to the Trial Court before he sought the
default demonstrated that his loan had been to Pedro Boix, not the Toscanos. Evidence
presented at the default judgment hearing demonstrated that Michael Toscano was not
involved with Auto One at the relevant times and that Coulter's wife was involved with
the company at that time. Perhaps most tellingly, the evidence showed that Telisa
Toscano had never been involved with Auto One and that Coulter knew she was not so
involved. Nonetheless, the Trial Court chose to disregard this evidence and entered a
default judgment against both Michael and Telisa Toscano. In doing so, the Trial Court
deliberately ignored the power granted to it by Utah R. Civ. P. 55 to "to establish the
truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter," prior
to entering a default judgment. This failure to consider the pleadings and the facts to
insure that its ruling achieved substantial justice was a final instance of clear error by the
Trial Court.

12
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Western Surety Company initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint against

Nathan Coulter, Sandra Coulter, Michael Toscano, Telisa Toscano and others on April
12, 2005. Trial Court Record ("Rec") 1-9. The complaint asserted claims interpleading
amounts Western Surety owed under a bond and seeking indemnification of those
amounts from Nathan Coulter, Sandra Coulter and the Toscanos. However, the substance
of those claims is not relevant to this appeal.
2.

An amended complaint was filed on May 9, 2005. Rec. 40-48.

3.

The Toscanos answered the amended complaint filed against them in this

matter on June 10,2005. Rec. 104-109.
4.

D. Bruce Oliver appeared as attorney of record for the Toscanos when he

answered the amended complaint on their behalf. Id.
5.

D. Bruce Oliver never filed a notice of withdrawal as the Toscanos'

counsel. See, generally, docket for Western Surety Co. v. Idaho Auto Auction, et al, Civil
No. 050906722 and Trial Court Record.
6.

Coulter answered the amended complaint on July 1, 2005, and submitted

with his answer the Cross-Claim against the Toscanos. Rec. 112-123.
7.

Coulter's Cross-Claim is contained on the final two pages of an eleven page

document, and the heading of the document gives no indication the Cross-Claim is
directed at the Toscanos. Rec. 112 & 120-122.

13
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8.

The Cross-Claim, which was not submitted pro se? consists of eleven

numbered paragraphs and does not contain titles listing the causes of action being
pursued. Rec. 120-122.
9.

The Cross-Claim alleges, in paragraph 6, that Coulter previously made a

demand on Auto One for "breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud." However,
in paragraph 7 it alleges losses resulting from "breach of contract, conversion and fraud."
Rec. 121.
10.

The Cross Claim does not describe any misrepresentation supporting a

fraud claim. Rec. 120-122.
11.

The Cross Claim references loans made to Auto One. Rec. 121, ^| 4.

12.

Though the introductory sentence of the Cross Claim refers to Pedro Boix,

Sylvia Boix, Michael Toscano and Telisa Toscano as "the Auto One Principals", Coulter
has not plead that they actually were principals of Auto One at the time he made his loan
to Auto One. Rec. 120-122.
13.

The Cross-Claim does not state the amount loaned under any contract, and

instead states only that Coulter loaned "certain sums of money to Auto One." Rec. 121.
14.

The Toscanos and Coulter both filed memoranda contesting summary

judgment sought by the plaintiff. Rec. 210-218 & 241-252.
15.

On December 4, 2006, this Court entered an order granting summary

judgment in favor of Western Surety against Coulter, the Toscanos and others. Rec. 492495.

14
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16.

Satisfaction of Western Surety 5s judgments against the Toscanos and

Coulter were entered on August 2 and August 13, 2007, respectively. Rec. 535-540.
17.

Shortly before those satisfactions of judgment were entered, Coulter and

Michael Toscano discussed potentially working together to satisfy Western Surety's
judgments against them. During these conversations, Coulter did not mention his
lingering Cross-Claim against the Toscanos.8 Rec. 610, ^| 5.
18.

In a pleading filed with the Trial Court on November 13, 2006, before he

sought to default the Toscanos, Coulter had submitted a copy of the contract evidencing
his loans to Auto One, which reflected the loan was to be repaid by Pedro Boix and not
the Toscanos. Rec. 455. He also submitted checks written to him from "Pedro Boix dba
Auto One." Rec. 457. None of these documents referenced the Toscanos.
19.

On January 17, 2008 Coulter mailed a default certificate and default

judgment (the "default papers") to 9738 South Tayside Dr. in South Jordan, Utah in an
apparent attempt to serve those documents on the Toscanos. Rec. 568-569.9
20.

Coulter did not attempt to serve the default papers on the Toscanos' counsel

of record, D. Bruce Oliver. Rec. 568-569; see also Coulter's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Disposition ("Coulter's Supp. Mem."), filed with this Court on or
about August 19, 2009, p. 3.
° Michael Toscano alleged this fact, and other relevant facts, in his second affidavit.
None were challenged in by Coulter before the Trial Court, despite numerous
opportunities to do so, including the opportunity to cross exam Mr. Toscano during the
June 16, 2009 hearing. June 16, 2009 Hearing Trans, Rec. 1033, p. 63.
9
The Toscanos believe the default papers were initially submitted to the Trial Court on
January 17, 2008, however the record is unclear.
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21.

The Toscanos did not reside at 9738 S. Tayside Dr. in January of 2008 and

the default papers mentioned were not forwarded to them. Rec. 611, ^ 11.
22.

The Trial Court entered a default certificate on February 4, 2008 and a

default judgment in the amount of $73,880.00 on February 6, 2008. Rec. 577-578 & 583585.
23.

The Toscanos did not receive the default papers until late March or early

April of 2008. Rec. 611, Tj 10. The papers he received were unsigned. Rec. 615.
24.

Miscommunications between the Toscanos and their counsel, uncertainty

regarding the nature of the default judgment, Coulter's counsel's failure to return a call
from the Toscanos' counsel, and the Toscanos being out of communication with their
attorneys for the week of May 5-9, 2008 delayed the Toscanos9 response to the motion to
dismiss. Rec. 611,ffl[11-14; Rec. 615, T\\ 4-7.
25.

On May 12, 2008, three months and six days after entry of the default

judgment, the Toscanos filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing, in part,
that, because their counsel never forwarded the Cross-Claim to them, they had no notice
of it. Rec. 586-597.
26.

During a hearing on July 23, 2008 the Trial Court indicated it would deny

this motion, reasoning in part that the motion should have been brought under Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1) rather than 60(b)(6) and that it was therefore time-barred because it was
filed six days late. Rec. 639.
27.

On July 25, 2008, the Toscanos filed a Renewed Motion to Set Aside

Default Judgment (the "Renewed Motion"). In this motion they asserted as grounds for
16

setting aside the default that: (1) Coulter and his counsel had failed to follow the Rules
of Civil Procedure by failing to serve the default papers upon the Toscanos5 counsel,
despite the fact that the Toscanos were not in default for failure to appear; (2) Coulter
failed to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to apply for a default judgment
after entry of the default certificate due to the fact that the Cross-Claim was not for a sum
certain; (3) The Court failed to hold a hearing to determine the amount of the default
judgment, rendering the judgment invalid; and (4) the default judgment was invalid
because it failed to state a claim against the Toscanos. Rec. 640-656.
28.

On August 1, 2008, the Trial Court entered an order denying the original

motion to set aside default. Rec. 670-672.
29.

No hearing was held on the Renewed Motion. However, in a minute entry

dated September 24, 2008, the Trial Court held "[GJiven that the amount sought by Mr.
Coulter was not for a sum certain, in accordance with Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court finds a hearing on the issue of damages is necessary.5' Rec.
746.
30.

Because this ruling carried with it the conclusion that the default judgment

was not valid, the Toscanos filed a motion to set aside the default certificate based upon
the good cause standard of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c). The grounds asserted in
that motion were that (1) the Cross Claim failed to state a claim; and (2) the default was

17
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the result of mistakes by the Toscanos' former counsel and failures to follow the Rules of
Civil Procedure by Coulter's counsel. Rec. 750-761.
31.

On November 13, 2008, the Trial Court heard the Motion to Set Aside the

Default Certificate. Rec. 836, November 13, 2004 Hearing Trans.
32.

In an Order dated December 8, 2008, the Trial Court ruled that, although it

had failed to hold a hearing to determine damages prior to entry of the Default Judgment
in its September 23, 2008 Minute Entry, it had not intended to set aside the Default
Judgment as to liability but had only intended to recognize that a hearing was necessary
to determine damages. Therefore, it directed the clerk and counsel to determine a hearing
date. Rec. 838-839, H 2 & 5.
33.

The Toscanos subsequently submitted a motion for reconsideration,

requesting that the Trial Court reconsider its determination that, although it had not held a
hearing on damages, the default judgment remained valid and could not be set aside.
Rec. 828-835.
34.

On April 27, 2009 the Trial Court heard the motion for reconsideration and

ruled that though the Toscanos had appeared in the case by answering the Complaint,
"they have not appeared in the cross-claim," and were "not entitled to be served." Rec.
921. April 27, 2009 Hearing Transcript, Rec. 921, pp. 34-35. On this basis, the Trial
Court found no error in Coulter's failure to mail the default papers to the Toscanos'
counsel. Id.

18
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35.

The Court held a hearing on June 16, 2009 to determine the amount of

damages for the default judgment. See Rec. 1033, June 16, 2009 Hearing Trans.
36.

At that hearing the Toscanos submitted a memorandum arguing that, due to

the deficiencies in the Cross-Claim and in light of the related underlying facts, the Court
should set damages at zero dollars. Rec. 978-985. The Toscanos requested, in light of
the deficiencies in the Cross-Claim and the evidence in the record indicating that the
Toscanos cannot be held liable for the debts that were alleged, that the Trial Court expand
the scope of the July 9, 2009 hearing on damages, and consider whether the Toscanos
could be held liable for the debts of Auto One at issue. Id.; see also June 19, 2009
Hearing Trans., Rec. 1033, pp. 124-128.
37.

During the hearing on June 16, 2009, the Toscanos presented evidence to

demonstrate that:
a.

Nathan Coulter ("Coulter") loaned the money that is the subject of

his cross-claim to Pedro Boix and that Pedro Boix guaranteed Coulter that this money
would be repaid (Rec. 927 and Rec. 1033 10 pp. 41-44);
b.

At the time of this loan, Michael Toscano had resigned as a member

of Auto-One (the company to which Coulter alleges he loaned the money) (pp. 55-56);

1{J

Rec. 1033 is the June 19, 2009 hearing transcript.
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c.

Telisa Toscano's only association with Auto One was being married

to Michael Toscano, and Coulter had never met Telisa Toscano,1 1 (Rec. 1035, pp. 50 and
100);
d.

Coulter knew (or, in light of the evidence, should have known),

when making the loan to Auto-One, that the Toscanos were not members of that
company at that time; therefore (See Rec. 1033, pp. 38-51 and 61).
38.

During the hearing on June 16, 2009, the Trial Court acknowledged that it

was difficult to determine the causes of action being pursued, stating "One should not
have to guess, I suppose, what causes of action are actually alleged in the Complaint,
quite frankly." June 19, 2009 Hearing Trans., Rec. 1033, p. 23. The Trial Court then
noted that "there seems to be no disagreement, however, that the cross-claim alleges
breach of contract," and that "[the Court] will need to make a decision as to what are the
causes of action alleged in the cross claim." Id.
39.

Nonetheless, at the conclusion of that hearing, the Court ruled that liability

had been conclusively established by the default and entered damages in the amount of
$188,598.62. Rec. 973, ffi| 1-3.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are four flaws inherent in the default judgment at issue. Each provides a
separate ground for reversal of the Trial Court's decision not to set aside the default

11 The only evidence offered by Coulter of Telisa Toscano's involvement in Auto One
was that she was a signer on the Western Surety Bond. Rec. 50. Mr. Coulter also admits
he signed a similar bond but denies he was an owner of Auto One. Rec. 51.
20
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judgment at issue. Three of the flaws in the judgment (numbered (1), (2), and (4), below)
relate to the procedure followed by Coulter and the Trial Court. The fourth flaw (number
(3), below) is simply that the default is void because it is based upon a cross-claim that
fails to state a claim against the Toscanos. The four grounds for setting aside the default
judgment are:
(1)

Coulter failed to follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in seeking the

default certificate and the default judgment by failing to serve the default papers on the
Toscanos' counsel when Coulter first sought the default by filing those documents with
the Trial Court. This failure renders the default invalid. The Trial Court incorrectly ruled
that Coulter was not required to serve the default papers on the Toscanos because, though
the Toscanos had answered the complaint and appeared in the case, they had not
appeared for purposes of the Cross-Claim. This holding is reversible error.
(2)

The default judgment was invalid because Coulter and the Trial Court

failed to follow the two-step process for entry of default judgment set forth in Utah R.
Civ. P. 55(b)(2). When the Trial Court recognized that it should have held a hearing
regarding the amount of damages prior to entry of the judgment, it should have also
recognized that there was no valid judgment in place until such a hearing was held, and
thus should have considered whether "good cause" exists to set aside the default
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certificate under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). The Court's failure to consider the "good cause"
standard for setting aside the default certificate was reversible error. 12
(3)

The default is void because it is based upon a cross-claim that failed to state

a claim against the Toscanos. The Trial Court committed reversible error by finding that
the Cross-Claim stated a claim for breach of contract against the Toscanos.
(4)

In light of the deficiencies in the Cross-Claim o, including the fact that it

does not state a claim, the Trial Court should have, at a minimum, considered additional
facts pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) prior to entering a default judgment. Those
facts, as demonstrated by the facts shown at the July 19, 2009 hearing, many of which
were in evidence prior ton the hearing, demonstrated that any doubt regarding the CrossClaim should have been resolved against Coulter and in favor of setting aside the
judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE
COULTER AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENTERING THE DEFAULT
CERTIFICATE AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
A.

Coulter Failed To Follow The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure In
Seeking The Default Certificate And The Default Judgment By Failing
To Serve The Default Papers On The Toscanos9 Counsel.

12 The facts of this case meet the requirements of the "good cause" standard found in
Rule 55(c). This Court could remand the case for consideration of whether the default
certificate should be set aside under the good cause standard. However, because that
standard is low, and because the facts, including Coulter's failure to properly serve the
default papers as stated in section I C, below, clearly demonstrate that good cause exists
to set aside the default certificate, this Court can and should simply set aside both the
default judgment and the default certificate.
22
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Coulter's failure to give notice to the Toscanos' counsel prior to entry of the
judgment as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2) and (b)(1) deprived the Toscanos of
notice of the impending default, denying them due process and rendering the default
certificate and judgment void. If this flaw is ignored, then the Rules of Civil Procedure
become mere suggestions. Parties seeking a default would be encouraged to behave
surreptitiously in seeking defaults and to provide any required notice in the manner least
likely to apprise the other party that a default was being sought.
1.

The Trial Court erred by ruling that a party who has appeared
by answering the complaint has not appeared for purposes
related to a cross-claim in the same action.

The Trial Court incorrectly ruled that, though the Toscanos had appeared in the
case by answering the Complaint, "they have not appeared in the cross-claim." An
appearance is an indication 'in some way [of] an intent to pursue a defense;' it is ca
relatively low threshold.' New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir.
La. 1996)(citation omitted). When deciding which parties have appeared and are thus
entitled to notice, our Supreme Court distinguishes between a party who has "elected to
participate at some level in an action" (emphasis added) and "a party who has declined to
participate in any regard by simply ignoring previous notice given in the form of the
complaint." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 282 (Utah 2000); see also Plaza del Lago
Townhomes Ass'n v. HighwoodBuilders, LLC, 148 P.3d 367, 370 (Colo. Ct. App.
2O06)(finding that one appears when one engages in conduct "sufficient to indicate to the
trial court that the defendant had an interest in participating in the litigation").
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In Lund v. Brown, the Supreme Court ruled that a party who has filed a complaint,
but not answered a counterclaim, has appeared in the action and thus is entitled to
service. Id. at 281-283. When service is not properly made upon a party who has
appeared in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 5, the default should be set aside. Id. There
is no basis for distinguishing between failure to answer a cross claim and failure to
answer a counter claim. If a party has participated in the litigation, it has appeared.
The position of Coulter and the Trial Court that appearance in the action by
answering the complaint does not constitute appearance for the purposes of a cross-claim
is illogical. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1) provides that, with limited exceptions, every paper
filed in the lawsuit "shall be served upon each of the parties." However, according to
Coulter and the Trial Court, default papers related to a cross-claim need not be served
upon a party who has answered the complaint but failed to answer a cross-claim. This
position creates the absurd result that, where a defendant/cross-defendant has answered a
complaint but failed to answer a cross-claim, that party is entitled to service of every
paper, except for papers through which the cross-claimant seeks a default against the
cross-defendant. Though parties who are not directly involved in the cross-claim (i.e. the
plaintiff) would be entitled to notice that the cross-claimant seeks a default against the
cross-defendant, the cross-defendant himself would be denied such notice.
Moreover, the risk that a cross-defendant will not be aware of a cross-claim is
greater than the risk that a defendant will not be aware of a complaint. A defendant is
entitled to service of a complaint and summons under Utah R. Civ. P. 4. This notice is
crucial to our concept of due process, as it highly likely to insure notice. However, a
24
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cross-claim may be served upon counsel under Rule 5(b)(1). In multi-party litigation,
counsel often receives numerous papers relating only to other parties. Particularly where,
as here, the heading of the Cross-Claim does not mention the Cross-Defendant by name,
there is a risk that counsel will overlook the Cross-Claim (as happened here). If counsel
is entitled to no other notice of the cross-claim or an impending default prior to its entry,
then a party may have liability established against it prior to ever having received actual
notice of the cross-claim. In short, the rule and procedure advocated by Coulter and the
Trial Court are grossly unfair and greatly increase the risk that a party who has, in good
faith, undertaken involvement with a lawsuit will learn, after the fact, that due to a simple
oversight by counsel, a default has been entered against it. The Court should decline
adopt the absurd and unfair position advocated by Coulter and the Trial Court.
2.

Coulter failed to follow Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5 which
requires that all papers be served upon counsel for a party who
has appeared in the case through counsel.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(1) requires that every motion, demand and
similar paper must be served upon each party. Rule 5(a)(2)(B) requires that all pleadings
and papers be served upon a party in default for any reason other than failure to appear.
Rule 5(b)(1) requires that, if a party is represented by an attorney, service must be made
upon the attorney.
Coulter did not serve his papers requesting default upon the Toscanos5 counsel of
record, D. Bruce Oliver. When Coulter, either by mistake or by design, sent the
documents to a residential address for the Toscanos rather than to their counsel, he bore
the risk that his notice would be ineffective or untimely.
25
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The rule requiring service upon counsel for a party who has appeared exists for
good reasons. A client may relocate without notifying the court of his new address. A
client may not realize the significance of a proposed default; he may not know the best
strategies for avoiding its entry; he may assume his attorney has received the documents
and is prepared to handle the situation; or he may not realize that the document has
actually been filed and requires action.
Coulter's error resulted in the Toscanos receiving the documents in late March or
early April of 2008, at least three months after the documents were filed with the Trial
Court and approximately one to two months after entry of default judgment. Therefore,
the Toscanos were, in fact, deprived of any notice of an impending default prior to entry
of a default judgment and never had the opportunity to cure the failure to answer the
Cross-Claim.
This failure was compounded by Coulter's counsel failure to follow the Utah
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. "Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a
default without first notifying other counsel whose identity is known, unless their clients'
legitimate rights could be adversely affected." Utah Standards of Professionalism and
Civility, Rule 16. Had Coulter's counsel observed either the Rules of Civil Procedure or
the Civility Standard, the Toscanos' counsel would have had notice of a pending default
prior to its entry and could have sought to avert it by filing an answer and opposing entry
of the default.
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3.

Coulter's failure to follow Utah R. Civ. P. 5 renders the default
judgment void and requires that it be set aside.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) requires a court to set aside a judgment that
is void. Coulter's failure to give notice to the Toscanos' counsel creates a significant
flaw in the default, rendering it void. Failure to follow the rules of civil procedure
regarding notice in seeking a default renders the default void. Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(noting that a default
judgment is void "if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process"); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. La. 1996)(failure to serve default
papers on party in default is a violation of due process rendering default judgment void);
Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 785 P.2d 682, 684 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)(finding that a
default judgment is voidable if entered without giving the opposing party requisite notice
of an application and hearing for default judgment). As mentioned above, in Lund v.
Brown, Utah's Supreme Court recognized that failure to serve default papers related to a
counter-claim upon a party who filed a complaint but failed to answer the counter claim
requires setting aside a default judgment. Id. at 281-283.
The requirement of service and notice are founded on concerns of due process.
Under circumstances similar to those in this case, the Fifth Circuit determined the lower
court erred in refusing to vacate a judgment granted against a party when service of
notice of a motion for summary judgment did not comply with the requirements found in
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Rule 5. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996). 13 A party
had appeared in the case, but had a default certificate entered against him for failing to
answer the complaint. Id. at 140. His co-defendant sought summary judgment on a
cross-claim made against him, but mailed the summary judgment papers to an invalid
address. IcL at 140. The trial court entered summary judgment when the party in default
failed to respond.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that because the defaulting party
had made an appearance in the case, "he was entitled under Rule 5(a) to service of all
papers in the suit, including the motion for summary judgment." IdL at 142. Where
service had been mailed to an invalid address, the mailing did not satisfy the notice
requirements of Rule 5. Id. The judgment was void because the defaulting party lacked
notice of the impending judgment and was denied due process. Id. at 143.
Accordingly, the court ruled that the lower court "erred in refusing the [sic] vacate
the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)." Id. The judgment was set aside, though the default
certificate, which apparently had been properly served by the original plaintiff, remained
in place. In the instant case, there is no question that Coulter failed to properly serve both
the request for a default certificate and the request for a default judgment. Thus both
should be set aside.

13 Utah's Supreme Court has relied on New York Life in prior decisions, noting that "The
federal interpretation [of Rule 5] is persuasive in light of the fact that our rule 5 is
"substantially similar" to federal rule 5." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 283 (Utah 2000).
28

B.

The Default Judgment Was Invalid Because Coulter and the Trial
Court Failed To Follow The Two-Step Process For Entry Of Default
Judgment Set Forth In Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

U

A default judgment is a two-step process. . . . If a party fails to plead or

otherwise defend, the clerk of the court makes an entry of default. After the clerk makes
the entry of default, the nondefauking party must move to have default judgment entered.
[In cases in which the judgment is not for a sum certain] the nondefauking party must
apply to the court for an entry of default judgment". Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973
P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1998). The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a judgment entered
without following this two step process must be reversed. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d
1193, 1196 (Utah 1984); see also Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 785 P.2d 682, 684
(Idaho Ct. App. 1990)(finding that a default judgment is voidable if entered without
giving the opposing party requisite notice of an application and hearing for default
judgment).
It is undisputed that, prior to entering the default judgment, the Trial Court did not
follow the two-step process for entering a default judgment. It simply entered a default
judgment for $73,880.00 based upon Coulter's request that it do so, without reviewing
the Cross-Claim to determine whether it stated a claim or whether it was for a sum
certain. When the Toscanos pointed out that the Cross-Claim was not for a sum certain,
the Trial Court recognized that it had erred, but failed to cure its error. Instead, it ruled
that the default judgment was still in place, and immune from challenge, and
subsequently held a hearing to determine the amount of damages.
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Had the Trial Court followed the Rules of Civil Procedure, it would have been
required to serve notice of a default judgment hearing upon the Toscanos prior to a
judgment being entered against them. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(C).14 This notice would
have given the Toscanos an opportunity to seek to have the default certificate set aside
under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c) prior to entry of a judgment. Even had it been briefly
delayed, it would have provided the Toscanos with notice of the default several weeks
earlier than the first notice they actually received. Given that the Toscanos missed the
deadline for challenging the default under the "mistake of excusable neglect" standard of
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) by only six days., one must assume that, had they received notice
of the default four to six weeks earlier, their motion to set aside the default would have
been filed at least six days earlier than it was, and would have been within the time period
for setting aside a default judgment under the "mistake or excusable neglect" standard of
Rule 60(b)(1). 15
C.

The Toscanos Were Prejudiced By The Failure Of Coulter and the
Trial Court To Follow The Rules Of Civil Procedure.

Had the Toscanos been given notice of an impending default, they could have
cured the default prior to entry of the default certificate. Had Coulter served the default

14 Rule 5(a)(2)(C) applies to all parties, regardless of whether or not they have appeared
in the case. Therefore, the error under this rule does not hinge on whether the Trial Court
was incorrect when it ruled that a party who has answered a complaint has not appeared
for purposes of a cross-claim.
15 The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ignoring a similar (though shorter) deadline for vacating judgments found in Idaho's Rule
60(b) where the party in default was not given required notices prior to the entry of the
default. Radioear Corp. v. Crouse, 547 P.2d 546, 549 (Idaho 1976).
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papers on the Toscanos' counsel when he filed them with the Trial Court on January 19,
2008, the Toscanos would have had until February 6, 2008 (the date the Trial Court
entered the default and default judgment) to file an answer and avoid entry of the
default. 16 Even if the Toscanos had responded later, they would have been able to
challenge the default certificate under the ugood cause" standard of Rule 55(c) prior to
the hearing to determine damages. At the very least, they would have had significantly
more time than they had to seek to set aside the default judgment under the "mistake or
excusable neglect" standard of Rule 60(b)(1).
The Toscanos could meet both the Rule 55(c) standard and the Rule 60(b)(1)
standard. The "good cause" standard encompasses those facts that would justify relief
under the "excusable neglect" standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); however, "good
cause" may also be met by facts that do not justify relief under the "excusable neglect"
standard. See Dennis Garberg & Assocs. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 775
(10th Cir. 1997)("the good cause required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) for setting aside entry
of default poses a lesser standard for the defaulting party than the excusable neglect
which must be shown for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)"); Sonus
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 61 F.R.D. 644, 647 (D. Mass. 1974)("The

lf>

As stated in section I.A., above, the default and default certificate are actually void
due to Coulter's failure to provide notice, so the prejudice is not necessarily relevant.
The Toscanos identify the prejudice here because it may be relevant if the Court
determines that the Trial Court's error in entering a judgment before holding a hearing
can be corrected by remanding to the Trial Court for consideration under the "good
cause" standard of Rule 55(c).
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standard for setting aside a final order or a judgment by default is more stringent than that
for setting aside an entry of default").
"[C]ourts generally tend to favor granting relief from default judgments where
there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial prejudice or injustice to
the adverse party." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc.,
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). "It is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion
to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for
the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside." Lund, 11
P.3d at 280; Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981). Court should
incline towards granting relief from a default judgment in order to give the parties a
chance to have their case heard. Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081; Heathman v. Fabian &
Clendenin, 311 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962) ("The courts . . . favor, where possible, a full
and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case").
In this matter, the Cross-Claim was contained on the final two pages of an eleven
page document, with no notice in the heading that it was directed against the Toscanos.
As a result, the Toscanos5 counsel did not see it. This case involved over twelve parties,
resulting in a large number of documents being filed. In light of all of the circumstances,
it is understandable that the Toscanos' counsel overlooked these two pages. Default "was
never intended to be used as a means of disciplining attorneys who may be derelict in the
performance of their duties." McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d
129, 131 (Utah 1966). More importantly, when a party has appeared, he or she should
not be defaulted without being given some notice of his error and a chance to cure it. See
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McKean, 411 P.2d at 130 (noting that, where a party has appeared and shown an interest
in defending, courts should be "somewhat indulgent" in setting aside defaults and
allowing a case to be decided on the merits). Here, the Toscanos' and their counsel were
given no notice that a default might be entered until four to six weeks after entry of the
default judgment. The result is contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure and is
discouraged by the Rules of Civility.
Lastly, under the Rule 60(b) standard, in order to set aside a default judgment the
moving party must establish that it has a meritorious defense to the claims on which the
default was based. Lund, 11 P.3d at 283. However, a party need not actually prove its
proposed defenses in order to show that it has a meritorious defense. Id., citing Erickson
v. Schenkers Int'lForwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994). As set forth in
section II. B., below, there is significant evidence in the record that Coulter gave money
to Pedro Boix, and not to the Toscanos, and that he was not under the impression that the
Toscanos would be responsible for repaying any of the money given to Boix. In fact, if
Coulter did in fact make loans to Auto One in June of 2004, the principals and owners of
Auto One at that time were Pedro Boix and Coulter's wife, Sandra. Thus, not only do the
Toscanos have a meritorious defense, they are very likely to prevail in this action.
II.

THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT IS
BASED UPON A CROSS CLAIM THAT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM
AGAINST THE TOSCANOS.
A.

The Cross Claim Fails To State A Claim Against The Toscanos.

"A default judgment is valid only if the well-pled facts show that the plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071,

6 5 1 :417557V-?

33

1076 (Utah 1998); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1998)
Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)( "A trial court asked to
render a judgment by default must first conclude that the uncontroverted allegations of an
applicant's petition are, on their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid claim against
the defaulting party"). Because Coulter's Cross-Claim fails to state a claim against the
Toscanos, any default judgment based upon it would be invalid. Therefore, the entire
default must be set aside.
In his Cross-Claim, Coulter does not state causes of action with any clarity, nor
does he state sufficient facts to support any causes of action. In paragraph 6 of the CrossClaim, he states that he previously made a demand on Auto One for "breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, and fraud." However, in paragraph 7 he states that he has suffered
losses resulting from breach of contract, conversion and fraud. He does not otherwise
address the claims for fraud or conversion. For example, the Cross-Claim contains no
allegation of "a representation .. . concerning a presently existing material fact which the
representer . . . either . . . knew to be false, or . . .made recklessly" as required to plead a
claim of fraud, nor does he identify any specific property that has been converted. See
Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1986)(setting forth elements of fraud claim).
The Trial Court appeared to struggle to find a claim for relief stated in CrossClaim. In the end, it arrived at the conclusion that "the cross claim alleges breach of
contract." However, the Trial Court failed to recognize that, even if the Cross-Claim
alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of contract against Auto One, it does
not allege sufficient facts to state a claim against the Toscanos.
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As the apparent basis for the contract claim, the Cross-Claim states that "Mr.
Coulter engaged in a commercial transaction whereby he loaned certain sums of money
to Auto One [emphasis added]." Though Michael and Telisa Toscano are referred to as
"the Auto One Principals"17 in the opening paragraph of the Cross-Claim, Coulter has
not pled that they actually were principals of Auto One at the time he made his loan, nor
has he pled that he loaned any money to or had a contract with "the Auto One
Principals". Coulter has also failed to allege whether Auto One is a corporation, LLC,
partnership or other form of business entity. Thus, even if the allegations of the CrossClaim were deemed admitted, one still could not know whether the Toscanos would be
personally liable for any obligation of Auto One.
Because Coulter does not allege facts that, if taken as true, would entitle him to a
judgment against the Toscanos, the Cross-Claim fails to state a claim against the
Toscanos and the default judgment based upon it is invalid. Skanchy, 952 P.2d at 1076.
B.

Even If The Trial Court Were Inclined To Construe The Cross Claim
To State A Claim Against The Toscanos, It Should Have Considered
Other Facts Necessary To Insure An Appropriate Judgment.

To construe the Cross-Claim as stating a claim against the Toscanos requires the
assumed existence of facts not pled in the Cross-Claim, such as that the Toscanos were

17 Using a term such as "principals" as shorthand for certain parties cannot be a
substitute for well-pled allegations of facts demonstrating that they were principals.
Otherwise, every plaintiff, in order to insure that he could overcome a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim would simply define the defendants as "the Liable Parties" or
some similar term in the opening of his complaint in order to overcome any deficiencies
in the substantive allegations.
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somehow associated with Auto One at the time Coulter loaned money to it. However, in
a pleading filed with the Trial Court before he sought to default the Toscanos, Coulter
had submitted a copy of the contract in question, which reflected that Pedro Boix, not to
the Toscanos, would repay the loans. Thus, at the time the Trial Court entered the default
judgment in February of 2008, it had facts in front of it that would cast serious doubts on
the legitimacy of Coulter's claims. The Toscanos requested, in light of the deficiencies in
the Cross-Claim and the evidence in the record indicating that the Toscanos cannot be
held liable for the debts that were alleged, that the Trial Court expand the scope of the
July 9, 2009 hearing on damages, and consider whether the Toscanos could be held liable
for the debts of Auto-One at issue.
Numerous cases, as well as the plain language of Utah R. Civ. P. 55, permit the
Court to "establish the truth of any averment" or "to make an investigation of any other
matter" in order to "reach an appropriate and fair resolution in granting a default
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Express Recovery Servs. v. Shewell, 111 P.3d 451,
453 (Utah Ct. App. 2007)(Holding that the trial court was correct in determining during a
default judgment hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) that it could not enforce a collection
commission provision because the provision amounted to a contractual penalty).
McGarvin-Moberly Constr. Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310, 1314-17 (Wyo. 1995)
(holding that in a hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,
which corresponds with the Utah rule, a trial court may permit the defaulting party to
litigate proximate cause and comparative negligence); Burge v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co.,
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933 P.2d 210 N.M. 1996 (holding a defaulting party may contest the percentage of his
negligence) (New Mexico's rule for default judgment is identical to U.R.C.P. 55).
During the hearing to determine damages, the Toscanos introduced evidence that
Coulter loaned money only to Auto-One, that Telisa Toscano had never been affiliated
with Auto-One, that Michael Toscano had resigned his position with Auto-One prior to
Coulter making his loan, and that Coulter's wife (emphasis added) was Pedro Boix's
partner in Auto-One at the time of the loans in question.^ The Trial Court heard this
evidence, but ultimately declined to make any determination necessary to insure that the
judgment it was entering had some basis in fact. Though the Toscanos believe that the
defects in the Cross-Claim render the default void, at a bare minimum, they required that
the Trial Court make some investigation into the facts before entering the default
judgment. The Trial Court's failure to do so was clear error and an abuse of any
discretion it might possess.
CONCLUSION
The Toscanos appeared in this case through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver. As a result
of submitting themselves to this action, they were entitled to at least two notices before a
default judgment could be entered against them - notice that Coulter had filed default
papers and notice that a hearing would be held prior to entry of a default judgment. They
received neither, and the contention their participation in the action is not an appearance
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The Toscanos have requested a transcript of this hearing for the record. To date, no
transcript has been received.
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for purposes of the Cross-Claim borders on absurd. Had they received either of these
required notices, they would have had multiple opportunities to avoid the default.
Instead, the Toscanos not even learn that default was being sought until one or two
months after entry of a judgment against them. As a result, they missed the opportunities
to avoid the default, or to have it set aside under the lenient "good cause" standard of
Rule 55(c). When the Toscanos finally received notice that Coulter was seeking a
default, they had to determine whether a default was actually being sought, and to what
claims it related. They had little time to make this determination and, as a result, they
barely missed, by six days, the opportunity to oppose it under the slightly more difficult
standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
The Trial Court refused to correct its errors and Coulter's errors which led to the
default, instead imposing the burden of those errors on the Toscanos. Moreover, when
confronted with a deficient Cross-Claim and facts highlighting the deficiencies, the Trial
Court once against forgave Coulter's errors.
The result of all of the foregoing is a process and judgment that are astoundingly
unfair to the Toscanos. The Toscanos request that the default be set aside and the case be
remanded so that they may defend this case on the merits.
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